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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“STEALING CONFLICTS” NO MORE?: THE GAPS AND ANTIRESTORATIVE ELEMENTS IN STATES’ RESTORATIVE-JUSTICE
LAWS
LYNN S. BRANHAM*
This Article first profiles key findings emanating from a statutory analysis of the
close to two hundred criminal-justice-related, as well as juvenile-justicerelated, statutory provisions in the United States that pertain to restorative
justice and practices (RJ/RP). This section of the Article unveils significant gaps
and other substantial problems in states’ restorative-justice laws, including
ways in which some of them conflict with core restorative tenets. The Article
then proffers seven recommended statutory provisions for states’ consideration
when enacting or amending their own RJ/RP laws. These recommended
provisions, combined with fidelity in their implementation, would help remedy
or avert the gaps and anti-restorative elements this study found in existing
restorative-justice laws in the United States.
Criminologist Nils Christie once lamented that laws have created legal
systems that are “particularly good at stealing conflicts.” 1 He decried criminaljustice systems’ relegation of the individuals most directly affected by a crime—
the person typically referred to as “the victim” and the person who committed
the crime—to the sidelines. As cases are churned through the criminal-justice
system, the victim becomes, in Christie’s view, largely a “nonentity” and the
person who caused the harm a “thing.”2
Christie’s criticisms of the law have resonated with the proponents of
restorative justice (RJ), which falls within the rubric of what is known as

* Visiting Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. B.A., University of Illinois;
J.D., University of Chicago Law School; M.S., International Institute for Restorative Practices
(IIRP). I would like to thank Dr. Craig Adamson and Dr. John Bailie, faculty at IIRP, for their
comments on course-related papers that were the precursor to this article. I am also grateful to the
faculty who attended a scholarship workshop at the Saint Louis University School of Law for their
feedback on the article. Finally, I am thankful for the labors of the dedicated students at the Saint
Louis University Law Journal that have made it possible for the findings and ideas in this article to
be shared with legislators and others exploring how to import restorative responses to crime into
the criminal-justice system.
1. Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1977).
2. Id. at 5.
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“restorative practices” (RP). 3 The focus of restorative justice is on actions that
cause harm. During a facilitated dialogue between the person harmed, the person
who caused that harm, and others, the person responsible for the harm better
understands its depth and breadth and assumes the responsibility of making
amends through agreed-upon reparative steps. Restorative justice is therefore
considered “reactive” in the sense that it is spawned by past harm-doing. 4 The
discipline known as “restorative practices” encompasses restorative justice but
also includes a proactive dimension—formal and informal processes to prevent
conflict, build and fortify relationships, and avert the infliction of harm. 5
Proponents of restorative justice have criticized criminal-justice systems, as
currently devised, for their failure to afford a person harmed by a crime and the
person who inflicted that harm the opportunity to engage in a dialogue, along
with others, about how the crime harmed the victim and what the person who
caused that harm could do to best remedy or mitigate it. 6 This failure leaves the
harm ensuing from a crime unrepaired and the relationships fractured by it never
mended. This harm can take many forms, including the shackling of the victim,
the person who harmed the victim, and both of their families with hurt, fear, or
shame for which conventional processing of a criminal case typically affords no
constructive outlet.
In light of the evident failings of the law from a restorative-justice
perspective, some might consider it discordant to explore how the law itself, in
the form of restorative-justice legislation, could be part of the antidote to these
3. Ted Wachtel, Defining Restorative, INT’L INST. FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES 1, 1
(2016), https://www.iirp.edu/images/pdf/Defining-Restorative_Nov-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2
E4-T6TJ]. The term “restorative practices” has a dual meaning, inviting a bit of confusion. First,
restorative practices is considered a field of social science. As described by Wachtel, it is “a social
science that studies how to build social capital and achieve social discipline through participatory
learning and decision-making.” Id. Second, the different types of restorative processes, such as the
restorative circles and family group decision-making described later in this article (see infra notes
46-61 and accompanying text), are called “restorative practices.” See, e.g., id. at 7 (referring to a
circle as “a versatile restorative practice that can be used proactively, to develop relationships and
build community or reactively, to respond to wrongdoing, conflicts and problems”).
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id.
6. For example, when amplifying why there is a need for a paradigmatic shift to restorative
justice, Dr. Paul McCold, a criminologist, explained:
Unlike the existing criminal justice systems that see crime as an offense against the laws of
the state and as deviant behavior that needs to be suppressed, punished or treated, restorative
justice looks at crime through a different lens. Crime harms people and relationships . . . .
Healing, repair of harm to people and relationships, is the goal of restorative justice . . . .
Critical to restoration is the central involvement of those most directly affected by the crime.
Victims, offenders, and their communities of care must have the opportunity to engage in
dialogue and potentially reach mutual agreement.
Paul McCold, Paradigm Muddle: The Threat to Restorative Justice Posed by Its Merger with
Community Justice, 7 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 13, 14–15 (2004).
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failings. This Article does just that. The first step in that endeavor was the
undertaking of an analysis of the close to two hundred existing criminal-justicerelated, as well as juvenile-justice-related, statutory provisions in the United
States that pertain to restorative justice or restorative practices. Juvenile-justicerelated statutes were included in this analysis in order to glean insights that might
inform the drafting and modification of restorative-justice legislation focusing
on criminal justice.
Part I of this Article summarizes some of the key findings of this statutory
analysis. This section of the Article unveils deficits unearthed in many states’
restorative-justice laws (also referred to in this article as “RJ/RP laws”),
including ways in which some of them conflict with restorative tenets. Part II
then spotlights seven statutory provisions for states’ consideration when
enacting or amending their own RJ/RP laws. These recommended provisions,
combined with fidelity in their implementation, would help remedy or avert the
gaps and anti-restorative elements this study has found in existing restorativejustice laws in the United States.
I. FINDINGS REGARDING EXISTING RESTORATIVE-JUSTICE LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES
A database of restorative-justice laws that have been enacted in the United
States provided the starting point for this study’s statutory analysis. 7 Utilizing
the citations listed in this database, searches were run on Westlaw to locate the
most current version of the statutory provisions in the database, excluding those
that were school-related. A supplemental search on Westlaw, using different
search terms, was then undertaken in August 2018 and again in July 2019 to help
ensure no statutes bearing on restorative practices in the criminal-justice and
juvenile-justice contexts were overlooked. These searches yielded almost two
hundred statutory provisions, which were then evaluated. Seven of the key
findings emanating from this evaluation of restorative-justice legislation
currently in place in the United States are spotlighted below.
A.

Finding #1: A number of restorative-justice laws in the United States
depart from the restorative precept that participation in a restorative
practice be voluntary.

A core premise of restorative justice is that for it to realize its aims, such as
the remedying of harm and potential fostering of remorse for causing harm to
7. This database, now maintained by the Graduate School of Social Work at the University
of Denver, can be found at Restorative Justice Laws, GRADUATE SCH. OF SOC. WORK, U. OF
DENVER (2019), https://socialwork.du.edu/content/restorative-justice-laws?field_resource_type_
target_id=All&field_res_keywords_target_id=All&field_res_locations_target_id=All&field_res_
owning_unit_target_id=All&field_res_associated_units_target_id=All#legislativedirectory
[https://perma.cc/944M-KZ62].
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others, the participation of people in a restorative process must be voluntary, not
forced. 8 One of the concerns underlying this premise is that compelling a person
harmed by a crime to participate in a restorative-justice conference will
exacerbate the feeling of powerlessness a crime can induce, accentuating its
harmful after-effects. 9 Another concern is that if a person who committed a
crime is forced to participate in a restorative-justice conference, he or she will
be more likely to deny, at least inwardly, the harm stemming from the crime or
its full extent and will often blame others during the conference for his or her
own poor choices that culminated in the crime. 10 In short, mandated
participation in a restorative-justice conference can abnegate the opportunity to
understand, and then assume personal responsibility for, the harm one’s crime
has caused.
A number of RJ/RP statutes in the United States comport with what is
considered one of the defining features of restorative practices—the voluntary,
not compelled, participation of those most directly affected by harmful criminal
behavior. 11 One of the unexpected findings of this study, though, was that a
8. See Economic & Social Council Res. 2002/12, (July 24, 2002), reprinted in U.N. OFFICE
DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMMES 99–102 (2006)
(“Restorative processes should be used only . . . with the free and voluntary consent of the victim
and the offender.”); see also Restorative Justice Values and Processes, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
NETWORK (2003), http://restorativejustice.org/10fulltext/restorativejusticenetwork.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/LM6C-3MX3], reprinted in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: BEST PRACTICE
IN N.Z. 35 (2011) (stating that participation in a restorative process is voluntary and that a process
“is not restorative if the participants are present under duress or are expected to speak or act or
decide on outcomes in ways contrary to their desires”).
9. See W. Reed Leverton, The Case for Best Practice Standards in Restorative Justice
Processes, 31 AM. J. OF TRIAL ADVOC. 501, 514–15 (2008) (describing how compelled
participation in what is designed to be a restorative process “can and does lead to re-victimization”).
10. See id. at 515 (recounting the “hostile attitudes” of people forced to meet with those they
have harmed and observing that voluntary participation leads participants to listen to each other).
11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-25-32(23)(ii)˗(iii) (1975) (defining restorative justice to include
“voluntary victim offender conferencing” and “voluntary victim offender mediation”); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1-901(o.5) (2018) (defining “restorative justice practices” as facilitated meetings
“attended voluntarily” by participants and marked by “voluntary dialogue”); FLA. STAT. §
985.155(4) (2019) (juvenile’s participation in a Neighborhood Restorative Justice Center’s
deferred-prosecution program is “voluntary”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1)(m) (2014) (person
convicted of a crime can be sentenced to a victim/offender reconciliation program provided it
secures a “written consent form voluntarily signed” by the sentenced individual and the victim);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-20-104 (2019) (“Any person who voluntarily enters a dispute resolution
process at a [victim-offender mediation] center . . . may revoke the person’s consent, withdraw
from dispute resolution and seek judicial or administrative redress prior to reaching a written
resolution agreement. No legal penalty, sanction or restraint may be imposed upon the person.”);
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.324 (1999) (if victim or victim’s guardian or close relative wants to
participate in victim-offender mediation with a person on parole or subject to mandatory
supervision, pardons and parole division can facilitate the person’s participation but “may not
require” it); WASH. REV. CODE §13.40.020(27) (2019) (defining “restorative justice” as entailing
ON
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number of statutes do not. Some authorize judges or other government officials
to require a person who committed a crime to participate in what the statutes
denominate to be a restorative process, while others are silent on this question,
not specifying that participation in a restorative practice must be voluntary. 12
One statute even goes so far as to authorize a restorative-justice program
established in the state’s correctional centers “to require” incarcerated
individuals to “offer acts and expressions of sincere remorse” for their crimes
and their impacts on victims and the community. 13 Many would, no doubt, view
“required sincere remorse” as a quintessential example of an oxymoron.
B.

Finding #2: Restorative-justice laws in the United States do not require
the securing of informed consent to participate in a restorative process.

Ensuring that a person’s consent to participate in a restorative process is
informed has been termed a “best practice” for those in the field of restorative
practices to adopt and implement. 14 Obtaining informed consent from
participants in a restorative process has value for many reasons. One of the
principal benefits is that informed consent helps guard against a person’s
involuntary participation in a restorative process. 15 If a person culpable of a
crime is not apprised, for example, that a refusal to participate in a restorative-

the “voluntary participation and communication between the victim, the offender, their families,
and relevant community members”); W. VA. CODE § 49-4-725(b)(2) (2015) (restorative-justice
program to which juveniles may be referred by a court shall include victim-offender dialogues or
family group conferencing “attended voluntarily” by the participants, including the victim and
juvenile).
12. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. § 202(f) (2008) (juvenile court “may . . . direct” a minor
who engaged in delinquent conduct to participate in victim-offender conferencing, provided the
victim consents); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2506(7) (2018) (court may “order” juvenile adjudicated
delinquent to participate in victim-offender reconciliation program); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
2152.19(C) (2017) (if victim assents, court’s delinquency disposition order “may require”
juvenile’s participation in a victim-offender mediation program); id. § 2929.17(L) (provided the
victim approves, a sentence in certain felony cases can include a “requirement” to participate in
victim-offender mediation); id. § 2929.27(A)(12) (2011) (provided the victim approves, a sentence
in certain misdemeanor cases can include a “requirement” to participate in victim-offender
mediation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 252(b)(15) (2018) (court may “require,” as a condition of
probation, participation in the “Restorative Justice Program”); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.070(11)
(2019) (specifying that participation of victims in victim-offender reconciliation programs “shall
be voluntary” with no mention of a parallel requirement for juveniles referred to juvenile court);
WIS. STAT. § 938.34(5r) (2019) (court may “order” juvenile adjudicated delinquent to participate
in victim-offender mediation if the victim agrees to participate).
13. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.440 (1997).
14. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 12; RESTORATIVE JUSTICE COUNCIL,
BEST PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICE 4, 12–14, 22 (2011).
15. Cf. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for
Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 812 (1999) (observing that
informed consent serves a parallel function in the mediation context).
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justice conference cannot be considered by a judge when rendering a sentence
in a case, he or she may only agree to participate in the conference due to a fear
of being penalized—sentenced more harshly—for failure to participate.
Garnering informed consent is also in keeping with the respect for human
dignity, considered one of the underpinnings of restorative justice and practices.
Dr. Howard Zehr, a criminologist well known for his expertise in restorative
justice, has described respect for “the individuality and worth of each person” as
the “supremely important,” “basic value” undergirding restorative justice: “If I
had to put restorative justice into one word, I would choose respect: respect for
all . . . . If we do not respect others, we will not do justice restoratively . . . .” 16
Ensuring that a person’s consent to participate in a restorative process is
informed is a manifestation of this respect for the inherent value of each human
being. In the words of Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, informed consent is a
“foundational moral and ethical principle that promotes respect for individual
self-determination and honors human dignity.” 17
This study found, though, that restorative-justice laws in the United States
generally neither mention nor provide for the securing of informed consent from
those participating in a restorative process. The Australian Capital Territory’s
Restorative Justice Act provides an example of a starkly different approach to
what, at present, is the statutory convention in this country. 18 This Act contains
a list of information that must be relayed to prospective participants in a
restorative-justice conference—the victim, the victim’s parent (in cases
involving a juvenile), and the person who harmed the victim—to ensure that
their consent to participate in a restorative-justice conference is informed. 19 The
delineated information of which these individuals must be apprised includes:
• The purposes of restorative justice, both generally and in this particular
case.
• What happens during a restorative-justice conference. 20
• Who may participate in such a conference.
• The “nature” of a restorative-justice agreement. 21
• The right to seek legal advice about participating in a restorative-justice
conference.
• That there is no obligation to participate in a restorative-justice
conference or to continue participating in a conference once it has
commenced.
16. HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 46–47 (2015).
17. Nolan-Haley, supra note 15, at 781. For additional observations on the linkage between
informed consent and respect for human dignity, see id. at 791–92.
18. Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004 (ACT) (Austl.).
19. Id. at s 32A.
20. The Act requires, in somewhat general terms, that participants be informed of the “nature
of a restorative justice conference.” Id. at s 32A(b)(i).
21. Id. at s 32A(b)(iii).
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• That if the person accused of criminal conduct has not entered a plea to
the crime, he or she can accept responsibility for it for restorative-justice
purposes while still pleading not guilty to the crime.
• That if the person accused of the crime is later convicted of it, the court
may take into account, at sentencing, that he or she accepted
responsibility for the crime during the restorative-justice process.
• That the court, though, is not required to reduce the sentence’s severity
because of this acceptance of responsibility.
• That the refusal to participate in a restorative-justice conference or to
continue such participation cannot be considered by a judge at the time
of sentencing. 22
C. Finding #3: Most restorative-justice laws in the United States do not
address the extent to which, if at all, RJ/RP-related communications are
confidential.
One of the defining features of restorative justice is the “engagement” of the
people most affected by a crime—the person who committed the crime, the
victim, and members of the community. 23 For this engagement to occur and be
meaningful, not skirting or just skimming the surface of what the participants in
the restorative process are really thinking and feeling, a safe space needs to be
created for open and honest, though respectful, dialogue.
Confidentiality laws can be vital to the creation of such a safe space. Without
an assurance that what is said during a restorative-justice conference will remain
confidential, participants may be reticent to candidly answer questions the
facilitator or others participating in the conference pose to them. 24 A victim may,
for example, be unwilling to reveal that the crime triggered a post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) or to describe the PTSD’s debilitating effects,
diminishing the ability of the person who committed the crime to fully
comprehend the depth and breadth of the harm ensuing from it. And without the
protective umbrella of confidentiality, a person whose crime has harmed others
may not be forthcoming in discussing the crime. This reluctance may stem from
a fear that the statements may later be used to support the filing of a criminal
charge, secure a conviction, or enhance a sentence. The person responsible for
22. Id. at s 32A.
23. ZEHR, supra note 16, at 31, 34–35. As mentioned later in this article, the “community”
that comprises the third stakeholder in a restorative-justice conference has no uniform definition.
Some restorative-justice experts and practitioners refer to “community” in relational terms, while
others view “community” from a geographical perspective. See infra note 72.
24. The link between confidentiality and candor has long been recognized in the mediation
context. The Uniform Mediation Act, for example, is designed to “promote candor of parties
through confidentiality of the mediation process, subject only to the need for disclosure to
accommodate specific and compelling societal interests.” UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note
(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2003).
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the harm may also be apprehensive that revelation of what is said during a
restorative-justice conference may later lead to the loss or denial of employment
or catalyze other adverse consequences outside the realm of criminal justice.
A number of the restorative-justice laws examined during this study address
the subject of confidentiality, though most do not. While there are variations in
the laws’ confidentiality provisions, they typically set forth a general rule that
the communications and records of a restorative process are confidential. 25 This
general rule, though, is frequently subject to one or more exceptions outlined in
the statute. 26 An example of such an exception is when disclosure is required by
a mandatory reporting law in instances of suspected child abuse. 27
25. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-104(b.5)(1) (2019) (subject to delineated
exception, “[a]ny statements made during [a restorative-justice] conference [as part of a sentence
to a “specialized restitution and community service program”] shall be confidential and shall not
be used as a basis for charging or prosecuting the defendant”); id. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(III.5) (same
when restorative-justice conference is held as a condition of probation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
9503 (2019) (subject to delineated exception, communications related to the subject on which a
victim-offender mediation process is focused are “not subject to disclosure in any judicial or
administrative proceeding”); 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5134(f) (2014) (subject to delineated
exceptions, “[a]ll discussions that occur within a Balanced Approach and Restorative Justice
process are confidential”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-247.03(1) (2019) (subject to delineated exception,
discussions during restorative justice practices, such as family group conferences and victimoffender mediation, “shall be confidential and privileged communications”); OR. REV. STAT. §
423.600(3) (2017) (subject to “limited exceptions” established by rule, facilitated-dialogue
communications “are confidential, and should not be admissible in any administrative, judicial or
arbitration proceeding”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-20-103(a) (subject to delineated exceptions,
communications related to the subject on which a victim-offender mediation process is focused are
“not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 154.073(a), (g) (2001) (subject to delineated exceptions, a dispute-related
communication of a participant in victim-offender mediation “is confidential, is not subject to
disclosure, and may not be used as evidence against the participant in any judicial or administrative
proceeding”).
26. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-104(b.5)(1) (2019) (exception when the
defendant commits a “chargeable offense” during the restorative-justice conference); id. § 18-1.3204(2)(a)(III.5) (2019) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9503 (2019) (exceptions when the parties
waive the privilege or a communication threatens injury or damage to the person or property of a
party to the dispute); 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5134(f) (2014) (exceptions when the participants
agree to “some level of disclosure,” the law requires disclosure (for, for example, “present child
abuse”), or communications reveal “an actual or potential threat to a participant’s safety”); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-2914.01(4)(c) (2019) (exception when communications are subject to mandatory
reporting for “new allegations of child abuse or neglect which were not previously known or
reported”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-20-103(a)-(b) (exceptions when parties waive confidentiality
and when a communicated threat of injury or damage to the person or property of a party involved
in the victim-offender mediation is relevant in a criminal case); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 154.073(f) (2001) (exception when there is a statutory duty to report abuse, exploitation, or
neglect).
27. See, e.g., 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5134(f); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-247.03(1); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(f).
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D. Finding #4: Restorative-justice laws in the United States limit, usually
greatly, the crimes to which they apply.
One of the questions to be addressed when drafting a restorative-justice law
is the crimes to which the statute will apply. Research has been conducted that
bears on, and can aid in, the resolution of this question. The results of a metaanalysis completed by a team of criminologists of the comparative effectiveness
of restorative-justice conferences and traditional court processing in reducing
recidivism are particularly germane. 28 This meta-analysis first examined 519
studies of restorative-justice conferences. 29 Only ten of these studies met the
stringent criteria established for inclusion in the meta-analysis. 30 To be included
in the meta-analysis, for example, the people accused or convicted of crimes
who participated in restorative-justice conferences must have been randomly
assigned to them and then compared with a control group. 31 In addition, the
consent to participate in a restorative-justice conference must have been
procured before this random assignment occurred. 32
The measure of recidivism in all but one of the studies was convictions
during a two-year period following the random assignment; the measure of
recidivism in the remaining study was arrests. 33 Nine of the ten studies included
in the meta-analysis reported lower recidivism following participation in a
restorative-justice conference. 34 The difference in the recidivism rate between
those who participated in a restorative-justice conference and those who did not
ranged from 7% to 45%. 35
One of the pertinent findings of the meta-analysis was that the recidivismreduction impact of restorative-justice conferences appears greatest for violent
crimes. 36 The researchers who conducted the meta-analysis noted that these
research results may signify that the “best return on investment,” in terms of
recidivism reduction, will occur when restorative-justice conferences are used

28. See Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Are Restorative Justice Conferences Effective in
Reducing Repeat Offending? Findings from a Campbell Systemic Review, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2015).
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 1, 7.
31. Id. at 4–5. The random assignment of victims to participate in restorative-justice
conferences is sometimes described, as it was in this meta-analysis, as “quasi-random” because not
all of the victims of a crime can be or are identified. Id. at 4; Heather Strang et al., Restorative
Justice Conference (RJC) Using Face-to-Face Meetings of Offenders and Victims: Effects on
Offender Recidivism and Victim Satisfaction. A Systematic Review, CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REV.
1, 12, 33 (2013).
32. Sherman et al., supra note 28, at 4–5.
33. Id. at 10.
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 12.
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for violent crimes. 37 Because the reported difference between violent and
property crimes was not statistically significant, though, they advised that the
data on the apparently greater effectiveness of restorative-justice conferences in
reducing recidivism in cases involving violent versus property crimes should be
viewed, at this point, “with caution.” 38
The recidivism-related research findings on the effects of restorative-justice
conferences complement other research profiling how restorative-justice
conferences can help address the unmet needs of victims, including the victims
of violent crimes. Restorative-justice conferences are, for example, more
successful in bringing “emotional restoration” to victims than traditional court
processing of criminal cases. 39 Studies on the impact of restorative-justice
conferences on victims have measured “emotional restoration” in different
ways. However, whether the metric was fear of being victimized again by the
same person, fear that that person would repeat the crime against someone else,
the securing of an apology, or the belief that the apology was sincere, victims
participating in restorative-justice conferences reported greater emotional
restoration than their counterparts who lacked that opportunity. 40
When viewed against the backdrop of the research on the effects of
restorative-justice conferences on those who have committed crimes and those
harmed by them, it is notable that the RJ/RP laws examined during this study do
not explicitly extend restorative practices to the full medley of crimes, both
violent and nonviolent, felonies and non-felonies. Instead, it is common for
statutes to exclude certain crimes from their province. Some laws, for example,
allow for a restorative process only in certain misdemeanor cases. 41 Others limit

37. Sherman et al., supra note 28, at 20.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Strang et al., supra note 31, at 39.
40. Id. at 37-39. In the meta-analysis described earlier in this article, the only measure of
emotional restoration that did not consistently reveal any difference between the two categories of
victims was the victim’s self-blame for the crime that had occurred. Id. at 36-37.
41. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.27(A)(12) (2011) (authorizing sentences
requiring defendants in misdemeanor cases, other than those with a mandatory jail sentence or those
involving a “minor” misdemeanor, to participate in victim-offender mediation); W. VA. CODE §
49-4-725(a) (2015) (authorizing diversion of juveniles to restorative-justice programs in cases
involving a nonviolent misdemeanor or a status (noncriminal) offense).
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their scope to nonviolent crimes. 42 Still others single out particular crimes, such
as sex crimes, for which restorative conferencing is unavailable. 43
E.

Finding #5: Most restorative-justice laws in the United States provide for
a limited number of restorative practices, ones that are not considered
“fully restorative.” 44

As mentioned earlier, 45 restorative practices are not confined to the
restorative-justice conferences through which harm can be diminished and
remedied. Restorative practices also encompass other measures that remedy
harm, proactively avert harm or conflict, or perform the dual function of allaying
existing harm and forestalling future harm. Two examples of these other
restorative practices are family group decision-making (FGDM) and circles,
both of which are briefly described below.
1.

Family Group Decision-Making (FGDM)

Family group decision-making, which is sometimes referred to as family
group conferencing, 46 empowers and equips a family to develop a plan to assist
a struggling family member. FGDM can be used for an array of reasons. For
example, a family may develop a plan to provide structure and support for a
42. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.155(2)(a)(2014) (authorizing referral to a Neighborhood
Restorative Justice Board of a juvenile accused of a nonviolent delinquent act and not previously
found to have committed a delinquent, criminal, or other illegal act); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.77
subd. 1 (2013) (authorizing awarding of state grants for victim-offender mediation before or after
the filing of a delinquency petition for a nonviolent crime and, in adult cases, after the filing of a
charge for a nonviolent crime, except in cases involving a family member or person living in the
household); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-274(3)(a) (2019) (authorizing victim-offender mediation when
a juvenile’s nonviolent act would constitute a traffic offense, misdemeanor, felony, or status
offense); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.95(2), (3)(c) (2019) (conditioning eligibility for grants for
“programs based on principles of restorative justice” on their banning any “violent offender” from
participating). But cf. D.C. CODE § 24-902(a-1)(2)(C) (2018) (directing that strategic plan focusing
on “youth offenders” address “best practices in restorative justice,” including for youth convicted
of violent offenses).
43. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1.3-104(1)(b.5)(1), 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(III.5), 19-2905(4), 19-2-907(1)(l), 19-2-925(2)(a)(X) (barring court-ordered participation in “restorative
justice practices” of people convicted of, or adjudicated delinquent for, unlawful sexual behavior,
domestic violence, stalking, or violation of a protective order); 19 GUAM CODE § 5134(d)
(excluding from “Balanced Approach and Restorative Justice Programs” juveniles who have
committed “serious crimes against persons or property,” criminal sexual conduct, or “serious family
violence”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.092 subd. 6 (2009) (excluding cases involving domestic
violence or domestic assault from restorative-justice program for first-time juvenile offenses).
44. For an overview of the distinction between “fully restorative” and partially restorative
processes, see infra notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
46. ELIZABETH SMULL ET AL., FAMILY POWER: ENGAGING AND COLLABORATING WITH
FAMILIES 7 (2012).
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child who is a chronic truant, foster the return of an incarcerated family member
to the community, or aid a member of the family who was sentenced to probation
or whose case was diverted altogether from the criminal-justice system in living
a law-abiding and productive life. 47
FGDM entails bringing family members together, including the person for
whom a plan is being prepared, to discuss and devise the plan. The “family”
participating in the planning process can be, and often is, loosely defined to
include other people who have had a pivotal role in the life of the person for
whom the plan is being prepared. 48 For example, an employer, favorite teacher,
mentor, or best friend might participate in the planning process.
During FGDM, the family first meets with treatment and other service
providers who share information about support services and treatment options
that are available within the community and explain any pertinent legal
requirements or safety-related needs that the plan would have to meet. 49 After
the sharing of this information with the family, the service providers and any
others present then leave the room, remitting to the family the task of creating a
plan tailored to meet the needs of the person for whom it is being prepared. 50
This private family time is considered a “core element” 51— “the heart” 52— of
family group decision-making. The written plan developed by the family

47. For accounts of the utilization of family group decision-making in the truancy, reentry,
and probation contexts, see id. at 21-26, 94-95. See also Magdolna Fabianne Blaha, Vidia Negrea,
& Edit Velez, The Use of Family Group Conferencing/Decision-Making with Prisoners in Prison
Probation and During After-Care in Hungary, in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE & LAW ENF’T, REPUBLIC
OF HUNGARY, EUROPEAN BEST PRACTICES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 258, 258–63 (2010) (describing how FGDM is used in Hungary to develop plans for
individuals who are soon to be released from prison).
48. See, for example, the definition of “family” in FGDM Guidelines Committee, Guidelines
for Family Group Decision Making in Child Welfare, AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOC. 25 (2010),
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/pediatrics/subs/can/FG
DM/Documents/FGDM%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPL2-343T]. “The extended family
group defines and decides who is ‘family.’ The family group may include maternal and paternal
relatives, stepchildren, half-siblings, friends, community supports, neighbors, religious leaders,
tribal elders and other natural supporters who have a significant relationship with the child, parent
or other family member.”
49. SMULL ET AL., supra note 46, at 87. An example of a safety-related need that a plan for a
youth would be expected to meet is the need for the youth to be living with people who will not
subject the youth to physical abuse.
50. FGDM Guidelines Committee., supra note 48, at 52. See also SMULL ET AL., supra note
46, at 91 (describing this stage of FGDM as “the time for families to find their own solutions to
problems”).
51. FGDM Guidelines Committee, supra note 48, at 52.
52. SMULL ET AL., supra note 46, at 91.
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members typically outlines responsibilities that family members and the person
for whom the plan is being developed will assume under the plan. 53
2.

Circles

One of the classic roles of the restorative practice known as a “circle” is to
“make visible” the interconnectedness of those in the circle despite what may be
their manifold differences. 54 The interconnectedness revealed and fostered by
circles begins with the gathering of the group into what, quite literally, is a circle.
A circle facilitator, often referred to as the circle “keeper,” ensures that all voices
are heard during the circle, typically through the use of a “talking piece.” 55 When
a person holding the talking piece is speaking, the rest of the circle members
listen, refraining from interjecting their responses. 56 Unlike the facilitator in a
restorative-justice conference, a circle keeper is considered an equal participant
in the circle; when holding the talking piece, the circle keeper may tender views
and ideas on the questions the circle is discussing and deliberating on. 57
Circles vary in their focus and purposes. A Circle of Support, for example,
can provide a milieu for the support and healing of a victim struggling in the
aftermath of a crime. 58 A Circle of Support and Accountability (COSA), on the
other hand, is a vehicle for supporting a person who is at an elevated risk of
committing a serious crime in his or her efforts to desist from crime. 59 A
53. For two child-welfare-related FGDM plans that exemplify the exposition of these
responsibilities, see PA. FGDM LEADERSHIP TEAM, PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY GROUP DECISION
MAKING TOOLKIT: A RESOURCE TO GUIDE AND SUPPORT BEST PRACTICE IMPLEMENTATION 18186, 239–45 (2008).
54. CAROLYN BOYES-WATSON & KAY PRANIS, HEART OF HOPE RESOURCE GUIDE: USING
PEACEMAKING CIRCLES TO DEVELOP EMOTIONAL LITERACY, PROMOTE HEALING, AND BUILD
HEALTHY RELATIONSHIPS 29 (2010).
55. KAY PRANIS, THE LITTLE BOOK OF CIRCLE PROCESSES 12, 35–37 (2005).
56. Id. at 12, 35.
57. Id. at 37.
58. Circles of Support can be used in other instances beyond when a victim is grappling with
the aftereffects of a crime. They can be convened whenever someone needs support in coping with
a major upheaval in his or her life. Id. at 16.
59. In places that adhere to the original COSA model, a group of trained volunteers meet
regularly in a circle with a person, known as the “core member,” who is at medium or high risk of
committing another serious crime, such as a sex offense. Mechtild Höing et al., Circles of Support
and Accountability: How and Why They Work for Sex Offenders, 13 J. OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY
PRACTICE 267, 267–68 (2013). The European COSA model adds an “outer circle” of professionals,
such as a core member’s probation officer and therapist, to this “inner circle” of three to six
volunteers. Id. at 268. One of the functions of this outer circle is to assist in arranging the services
needed to facilitate the core member’s adoption of a law-abiding lifestyle within the community.
Id.
The dialogue fostered during a COSA has many aims. Examples include: (1) to ensure that
the core member understands that while the circle members reject the core member’s crime, they
accept him as a fellow human being; (2) to help the core member bond with others in what are
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Welcome and Reentry Circle provides a means of welcoming a person released
from incarceration back into the community, discussing the challenges of reentry
facing this person, and identifying steps that can be taken by the returning citizen
and circle members to surmount those challenges. 60 Peacemaking Circles can be
used for a range of reasons, including to build and strengthen relationships and
to defuse conflict and tensions that could erupt into injurious and perhaps
criminal actions. 61
3.

Incorporating Restorative Practices, in Addition to Restorative-Justice
Conferences, into Criminal-Justice Systems

In the criminal-justice context, a restorative practice other than, or in
addition to, a restorative-justice conference is sometimes needed to address the
depth or breadth of harm ensuing from, or related to, a crime, or to avoid a
recurrence of criminal behavior. As mentioned earlier, 62 family group decisionmaking, Circles of Support, Circles of Support and Accountability, Welcome
and Reentry Circles, and Peacemaking Circles may be employed to redress and
prevent crime-related harm, strengthen relationships, and further other
restorative aims in ways that a restorative-justice conference cannot. Other
restorative practices can also help remediate harm that is not the focal point of a
restorative-justice conference but is linked to a crime or the person who
committed it. One example of such a restorative practice is a circle where an
imprisoned person meets with family members to discuss the injurious effects
of the imprisoned person’s crime and imprisonment on the family members and
how to rebound from that harm. 63 Compassionate Witnessing Circles represent
another example. 64 These circles focus on helping to alleviate a different kind of
strong, positive relationships, a protective factor that promotes desistance from crime; and (3) to
challenge and change the cognitive distortions, such as blaming the victim or diminishing the
seriousness of one’s wrongful conduct, that are common when individuals commit crimes or engage
in other wrongdoing. Id. at 270–71, 276. For additional details on how COSAs are structured and
function, see id.
60. For a video of a Welcome and Reentry Circle held at a school to which a student was
returning after a period of juvenile-justice-related confinement, see Restorative Justice for Oakland
Youth & Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., Restorative Welcome and Reentry Circle, OUSD (April 26,
2013), https://www.ousd.org/restorativejustice [https://perma.cc/4EYR-CNHX].
61. For detailed information on Peacemaking Circles, including their theoretical
underpinnings, descriptions of some of the different types of Peacemaking Circles, and templates
that can be used when facilitating them, see BOYES-WATSON & PRANIS, supra note 54.
62. See supra notes 46–61 and accompanying text.
63. See Videotape: Vidia Negrea, RP625prisonFgdm, INT’L INST. FOR RESTORATIVE
PRACTICES (2015) (on file with author). Vidia Negrea, a restorative practitioner from Hungary, has
explained why these circles were instituted in a prison in Hungary: to bring restoration to families
in “serious crisis” due to the imprisonment by providing a forum where family members can share
their needs, feelings, and concerns with the imprisoned person. Id.
64. In 2003, Dr. Kaethe Weingarten completed a pioneering work on the process of
compassionate witnessing and its healing effects. See KAETHE WEINGARTEN, COMMON SHOCK:
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harm that is endemic in the criminal-justice milieu—trauma-related harm, a
harm that can afflict both those who commit, and those harmed by, a crime. 65
The study undertaken for this article revealed that many of the restorativejustice laws in the United States authorize or require the institution of victimoffender mediation. 66 A smattering of others provide for the establishment of
community reparative boards, 67 which are also called neighborhood
accountability boards, community accountability boards, youth panels, or some
other term. 68 It is rare, though, to see specification of, and provision for, a broad
range of restorative practices in the statutes. A Colorado statute is one of a small
handful of notable exceptions. This statute defines “restorative justice practices”
as including “victim-offender conferences, family group conferences, circles,
community conferences, and other similar victim-centered practices.” 69
Not only is it a relative rarity within the United States for a statute to provide
for the incorporation of a broad range of specifically identified restorative
practices into a state’s criminal-justice system, but most of the practices to which
the statutes do allude are not considered “fully restorative.” 70 As mentioned
earlier, 71 there is general agreement within the field of restorative practices that
there are three chief stakeholders in restorative justice—the person who caused

WITNESSING VIOLENCE EVERY DAY: HOW WE ARE HARMED, HOW WE CAN HEAL 192 (2003).
Building on the foundation laid by Weingarten, the International Institute for Restorative Practices
provides training (which this author has received) on how to facilitate a Compassionate Witnessing
Circle.
65. Many people who commit serious crimes were subjected to trauma-inducing experiences,
such as sexual abuse or interpersonal violence, when they were children, and their own crimes can,
in turn, spawn trauma in their victims. See Michael S. Martin et al., Risk of Violence by Inmates
with Childhood Trauma and Mental Health Needs, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 614, 614 (2015)
(reporting the results of studies finding that between 13–55% of male inmates and 43–80% of
female inmates were victims of physical or sexual abuse or had witnessed family violence).
66. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§ 9501(b)(1), 9502(b)(4) (2019); MINN. STAT. § 611A.77
subd. 2 (1)-(2) (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.777(5)(1) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-51304(1)(k) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-20-101(b)(1), 16-20-102(b)(3) (2009); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.13 (West 2001); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.324 (West 1999); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 62A-7-112(4)(a)(iv); 78A-6-117(h)(iii), 78A-6-602(e)(vii) (West 2019).
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.155(3)(a), (4)-(5) (2014) (authorizing establishment in
each county of a Restorative Justice Board that “may impose . . . sanctions,” such as “require”
restitution or work for the victim, on a juvenile appearing before it as part of a deferred-prosecution
program); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 910a(a) (West 2012) (requiring the establishment of “reparative
boards” in communities).
68. See Mara Schiff et al., Neighborhood Accountability Boards: The Strength of Weak
Practices and Prospects for a “Community Building” Restorative Model, 36 WASH. U. J. OF L. &
POL’Y 17, 18-19 (2011).
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-901(3)(o.5) (West 2013).
70. See Wachtel, supra note 3, at 3–4 (differentiating between fully, mostly, and partly
restorative processes).
71. See ZEHR, supra note 23 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

160

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:145

the harm, the victim, and the community. 72 The exclusion of any one of these
stakeholders from a restorative practice makes it less than fully restorative under
this classic restorative-justice framework. 73 Thus, victim-offender mediation
fails to meet the parameters of being fully restorative when, as often happens,
participants are confined to the person who caused the harm, the victim, and the
mediator, with others (the “community”) absent who could lend perspective
about the harm the crime caused and how it can best be remediated. 74 And when
people who have committed crimes appear before a community reparative
board, the victim is often absent, playing no role in the process of unmasking
the crime’s harm and determining how to alleviate and remedy that harm. 75
F.

Finding #6: Most restorative-justice laws in the United States provide for
the incorporation of restorative practices into only one or a few stages of
the criminal-justice process.

A criminal case is marked by multiple stages. The law-enforcement stage
precedes the referral of a case to a prosecutor for the potential filing of a criminal
charge. During the next stage of the legal process, the pre-charge stage, the
prosecutor decides whether to file a criminal charge. If a charge (or charges) is
filed, the case moves into the post-charge, pre-conviction stage—the stage where
the person charged with a crime has neither pleaded, nor been found, guilty.

72. See, e.g., Wachtel, supra note 3, at 3. Restorative-justice theorists and practitioners ascribe
different meanings, though, to “the community” that constitutes the third restorative-justice
stakeholder. For example, when some use this term, they are referring to “communities of care.”
See Roxana Willis, Three Approaches to Community in Restorative Justice, Explored Through a
Young Person’s Experiences of a Youth Offender Team in England, 4 RESTORATIVE. JUST.: AN
INT’L J. 168, 170–71 (2016) (listing examples of restorative-justice experts adopting the
community-of-care framework). The “community,” when used in this sense, includes people, such
as spouses, parents, siblings, close friends, teachers, and others with whom the victim or the person
who harmed the victim has a “significant emotional connection” and who was therefore also
“directly affected” by the crime. Paul McCold & Ted Wachtel, In Pursuit of Paradigm: A Theory
of Restorative Justice, EFORUM 2 (Aug. 12, 2003), http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/paradigm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NL3Y-2PCX]. To others in the field of restorative justice, “community” has a
geographical focus, often the locality in which the person harmed and the person who caused the
harm live. Willis, supra, at 169. Under this “community-of-place approach,” where “community”
is defined in terms of place rather than relational connections, the representatives of the community
participating in a restorative process are typically volunteers who live or work in the defined
geographical area and are often strangers to the other participants. Id. at 171, 172. For additional
information on the community-of-care and community-of-place approaches to the meaning of
“community” in the restorative-justice context, see id. at 170–75.
73. Wachtel, supra note 3, at 3–4.
74. Id. at 4.
75. See Schiff et al., supra note 68, at 20–21 (noting that the “most valid criticism” of
neighborhood accountability boards is their “inability or disinterest in engaging victims” and failure
to treat victim participation as a priority).
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The fourth stage of the criminal-justice process is the postconviction,
presentencing stage. At this point in the process, the person accused of a crime
has been found guilty of it, though a sentence has yet to be imposed. During the
ensuing stage, a sentence is imposed and served. The sentence may be a
community-based sentence such as probation, a sentence to confinement in
prison or jail, or some mixture of the two kinds of sentences. 76
Providing access to restorative-justice conferences and other restorative
practices at all stages of the criminal-justice system comports with one of the
real-life dimensions of a crime’s aftereffects—that others cannot dictate when
someone will be ready for a restorative dialogue. Some people, for example,
may want to participate in a restorative-justice conference very soon after the
commission of a crime, while others may need more time, and perhaps much
more time, before they feel ready to face and speak with the person who harmed
them or whom they harmed.
Most of the states whose existing laws were examined as part of this study
limit their application to one or just a few stages of the criminal-justice (or
juvenile-justice) process. 77 When the laws are considered in toto though, they
span the full spectrum of the justice system—from diversion options in lieu of
prosecutorial or court processing at the front end of the legal system to, at the

76. A sentence to probation may, for example, be conjoined with some period of confinement
in jail. And a prison sentence may include a period of time when a person may or must be
conditionally released from confinement. Being on parole is a classic example of the conditionalrelease portion of a sentence.
77. For examples of statutes authorizing or requiring that one or more restorative practices be
available to divert people from court processing within the criminal-justice or juvenile-justice
system, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2-303(1)-(2) (West 2019), 19-2-512(2) (West 2013)
(juvenile); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571.31.4(c)(11) (West 2014) (juvenile); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
388.24 subd. 2(1) (West 2017), 609.092 (West 2009) (juvenile); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-260.06(6)
(West 2019) (juvenile); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1706(a)(4) (West 2019) (juvenile); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78A-6-602(2)(e)(vii) (West 2018) (juvenile). For examples of statutes providing for
the incorporation of one or more restorative practices into the sentence or disposition of a case, see
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(III.5) (West 2018) (adult), 18-1.3-104(1)(b.5)(1)
(West 2014), 19-2-905(4) (West 2019), 19-2-907(1)(l) (West 2018) (juvenile); 19 GUAM CODE
ANN. § 5134(e) (West 2014) (juvenile); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 217.777(2)(5)(l) (West 2018),
559.021(2) (West 2017) (adult); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201(4)(o) (West 2019) (adult); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2506(7) (West 2019) (juvenile); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.19(C)
(West 2017) (juvenile), 2929.17(L) (West 2009), 2929.27(a)(12) (West 2011) (adult); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. § 991a(A)(1)(m) (West 2019) (adult); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-117(2)(j)(iii) (West 2019)
(juvenile); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7030(b) (West 2010) (adult). For examples of statutes
authorizing or requiring that one or more restorative practices be instituted in other criminal-justicerelated contexts, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-309.5(4)(a)(1)(I), (2)(L) (West 2019) (juvenile
reentry following confinement); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.196 subd. 3 (West 2003) (defining
“probation violation sanction” to include participation in a restorative-justice program); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 217.440 (West 1997) (within correctional centers (prisons)).
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back end, post-release supervision following release from confinement. 78
Vermont is one of the few states with a more expansive law, one encompassing
multiple stages of the criminal-justice system. One Vermont statute states that
the legislature intends for “restorative justice approaches”‘ to be developed and
used by law-enforcement officials “whenever feasible and responsive to specific
criminal acts,” for court-diversion purposes, in sentencing, and in
postsentencing when individuals are in the custody of the Department of
Corrections. 79
G. Finding #7: Restorative-justice laws in the United States do not, at
present, ensure that there is the funding, training, and other structural
support needed for restorative practices to permeate a criminal-justice
system.
1.

Funding

Through general appropriations bills, states allocate considerable sums of
money to subsidize the costs of what are considered core components of their
criminal-justice systems, such as prosecution, courts, and corrections.
Sometimes, states pay the full costs of a segment of that system. States typically
assume, for example, sole fiscal responsibility for the operation of prisons in the
state. 80 Other times, states share criminal-justice-related funding responsibilities
with local governments, underwriting, for example, some, though not all, of the
costs of operating courts and providing probation services. 81
Just as adequate funding is needed for the traditional functioning of a
criminal-justice system, ample funding support is integral to the institution of
restorative justice and practices throughout the system. Funding is needed, for
example, to support the training of criminal-justice officials about restorative
practices, planning of how to integrate restorative practices into the criminaljustice system, implementation of the plan, and evaluation on an ongoing basis
of the plan’s effects and effectiveness.
One of the revelations stemming from the review of the RJ/RP statutes in
this country is how weak the funding support is for the integration of restorative
78. For examples of statutes authorizing the use of restorative practices for diversion purposes,
see supra note 77. For an example of a statute providing access to a restorative practice (victimoffender mediation) when a person is on parole, see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.324 (1999).
79. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 2a(b) (2018).
80. W. David Ball, Why State Prisons?, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 107 (2014). The state
funding of prisons has been described as a “‘correctional free lunch’” for localities. Id. at 77
(quoting FRANK E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 140 (1991)).
81. See, e.g., State and Local Funding for the Illinois Courts, THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE
ILL. CTS., http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/General/Funding.asp [https://perma.cc/ZD5W-VJWS]
(last visited Feb. 10, 2020) (reporting that the state and counties in Illinois share the responsibility
of funding the courts, including probation services).
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justice and practices into criminal-justice (or juvenile-justice) systems. The
brunt of the statutes that address funding do so in one of two limited ways. 82
First, some provide for the awarding of grants to support some types of
restorative programs. 83 Grants are known as “‘soft’ money,” often funneling
only one-time funding to an agency or entity for a designated purpose or leaving
the renewal of funding uncertain. 84 The second type of funding-related statutes
82. A Utah statute reflecting a different approach to the state funding of restorative justice and
practices, though, bears noting. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-7-112(4)(a)(iv) (West 2019). This
statute is the outgrowth of what has been termed the “Justice Reinvestment Initiative.” 35 States
Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice Reinvestment, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (July
11, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/07/pspp_reform_matrix.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/NM94-R62P]. States participating in this initiative implement evidence-based strategies to
reduce correctional costs and recidivism. The Justice Reinvestment Initiative: Experiences from the
States, THE URBAN INST. 1 (July 2013), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/238
81/412879-The-Justice-Reinvestment-Initiative-Experiences-from-the-States.PDF [https://perma
.cc/Y2K8-VJT5]. The states then reinvest the resulting cost savings into research-based programs
and processes that improve public safety while holding people accountable for their law-violating
conduct. Id.
The Utah statute authorizes the disbursement of funds from the “Juvenile Justice
Reinvestment Restricted Account” to support the expansion of victim-offender mediation programs
throughout the state. At least on its face, though, the statute does not provide a secure funding base
even for this one, partially restorative process. First, the statute does not require that funds be
expended to implement this restorative practice statewide. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-7112(4)(a)(iv) (West 2019) (“Upon appropriation by the Legislature, the department may expend
funds from the account [for] . . . victim-offender mediation.”) (emphasis added). Second, the statute
cites victim-offender mediation as only one of several programs and practices to which funds from
the account can be funneled, meaning that victim-offender mediation programs, in effect, compete
for funding with these other programs and practices. Examples of some of the other programs and
practices to which funds may be directed include mobile crisis outreach teams and programs
delivering cognitive, behavioral, and family therapy. Id. § (4)(a)(ii), (b). See also MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV’T § 9-3209(b)(2)(iv) (West 2016) (authorizing, but not requiring, the disbursement to
restorative-justice diversion programs of savings reaped from implementation of the Justice
Reinvestment Coordinating Council’s recommendations).
83. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 5027(b) (West 2016) (providing for grants that are “one
time in nature” to not-for-profit organizations for prison programs grounded on “restorative justice
principles”); id. § 6046.3(a), (b)(1) (West 2016) (providing for a “competitive grant program” to
fund services and programs for people within the criminal-justice system with a history of mentalhealth or substance-use disorders, with one funding priority being proposals that both “advance
principles of restorative justice” and have the demonstrated capacity to reduce recidivism); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-7038 (West 2016) (including “balanced and restorative justice programs” on the
list of juvenile “community correctional services” for which counties can receive state grants);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.77 subd. 1 (2019) (providing for the award of grants to nonprofit
organizations creating or expanding victim-offender mediation programs).
84. Cf. Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of
Women in the Dayton Peace Accords, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 103, 170 (2001) (referring to fundingrelated anxiety due to dependence on grants, a form of “‘soft’ money” that makes entities’
“continued existence and priorities uncertain”); Susan R. Jones, Promoting Social and Economic
Justice Through Interdisciplinary Work in Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 249, 260
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authorize restorative programs to defray expenses by levying fees on those who
opt to participate in a restorative process following their commission of a
crime. 85 The effect of these latter statutes is to condition the level of resources
available for the restorative practice in question on the capacity and willingness
of potential RP participants to pay those fees.
2.

Other Structural Support

Several years ago, Dr. Shannon Sliva and Carolyn Lambert, then the
Program Director of the Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at
Georgia State University, conducted research to identify statutes in the United
States to be included in the earlier-mentioned database 86 of restorative-justice
laws in the United States. 87 As part of this study, they also assessed the level of
support the identified statutes provided at the time of their study for restorative
justice within the criminal-justice or juvenile-justice systems in a state. 88 They
reported that seven states provided “structured support” for restorative justice—

n.45 (2004) (noting that the temporary funding ensuing from soft-money grants results in perennial
shifts in the number of existing programs); Alecia Meuleners, Finding Fields: Opportunities to
Facilitate and Incentivize the Transfer of Agricultural Property to New and Beginning Farmers,
18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 211, 225 (2013) (pointing to the “substantial constraint on program
activities” when soft-money grants are the funding source).
85. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 45-28-82.25(c) (West 2019) (portion of fees paid to participate in
“restorative justice initiative program” may be paid to the agency or entity providing restorativejustice-related services); id. § 45-39-82.05(c) (West 2019) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 181.3-104(1)(b.5)(1) (West 2014) (fee paid by defendant sentenced in a criminal case to participate
in a “restorative justice practices victim-offender conference” is based on a sliding scale, cannot
exceed $125, and may be waived by the court); id. § 19-2-905(4) (West 2019) (same for juvenile
adjudicated delinquent ordered to participate in conference before sentencing); id. § 19-2-907(1)(l)
(West 2018) (same for juvenile adjudicated delinquent who participates in “restorative justice
practices” as part of the sentence); id. § 18-25-10(1), (2)(b), (4) (West 2017) (ninety-five per cent
of ten-dollar surcharge each person convicted of, or adjudicated delinquent for, a crime must pay
is remitted to the state’s “restorative justice surcharge fund” unless the court waives all or part of
the surcharge due to inability to pay); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201(4)(p) (2019) (as a condition
of suspending or deferring imposition of part or all of a sentence, court can order defendant to
participate in a restorative-justice program and pay a “participation fee” of up to $150 if the
defendant is accepted into the program); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1)(m) (West 2019)
(program fee of not less than $15 and not more than $60 when person convicted of a crime is placed
in a “victim/offender reconciliation program”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. §
152.007(a)-(b) (West 2013) (“reasonable fee,” not to exceed $350, to participate in pretrial victimoffender mediation program).
86. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
87. Shannon M. Sliva & Carolyn G. Lambert, Restorative Justice Legislation in the American
States: A Statutory Analysis of Emerging Legal Doctrine, 14 J. OF POL’Y PRAC. 77, 81 (2015). The
Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution first maintained this database, beginning in
2015. Id. at 85. In 2019, the database was moved to the University of Denver. See supra note 7.
88. Id. at 83.
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Colorado, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Texas, and
Vermont. 89
The benchmarks that a state had to satisfy to be classified as a structuredsupport state are a bit unclear. The report of the study’s findings first said that to
be categorized as providing structured support, a state’s statute or statutes had
to (a) require or “strongly encourage” the utilization of restorative practices in
the criminal-justice or juvenile-justice system and (b) provide “significant
support” for the implementation of these practices into the system. 90 Statutory
affirmation that state funds were available for this implementation plus
provision in the statute for state-level implementation guidelines was considered
one indicator of this significant support. 91 But when explaining later in the report
the basis for the conclusion that seven states provided structured support for
restorative practices, the report seemed to indicate that a state was classified as
providing structured support for restorative practices as long as it met one, not
necessarily both, of the two criteria spelled out earlier. The report related that
seven states “were coded structured, providing either a mandate to use
restorative justice in some context or a high level of structure for its use.” 92
Despite this ambiguity in the study’s findings, its overarching conclusion—
that “[n]ationally, restorative justice remains a marginally supported justice
practice at the level of state policy”—is clear and noteworthy. 93 The study found
that the handful of states with a statute providing “structured support” for
restorative justice during one or a few stages within its criminal-justice or
juvenile-justice system, such as to divert youth from the juvenile-justice system,
did not provide that level of support for the implementation of restorative
practices in many other parts of the justice system. 94 For example, many of the
seven states deemed to be providing “structured support” for restorative
practices in one stage of the justice system gave, in another stage, just a general
“nod” to restorative justice or simply mentioned it in a list of implementation
options. 95

89. Id. at 88.
90. Id. at 83 (“Statutes offering structured support strongly encourage or mandate the use of
restorative justice practices and provide significant support for implementation, such as
confirmation of funding and administrative guidelines.”).
91. Id. While the study cited this “confirmation of funding and administration guidelines” as
an example of what sufficed for the “significant support” of the implementation of restorative
justice practices needed for a state to be classified as providing “structured support” for restorative
justice, it is unclear what other indicators of implementation support would lead or led to a state
being categorized as a “structured support” state. Id.
92. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
93. Sliva & Lambert, supra note 87, at 88.
94. Id. at 88–89.
95. Id. at 89. See also id. at 83, 88 (defining what constituted only “ideological support” for
restorative justice as opposed to structured support).
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The statutory analysis undertaken for the current study on which this article
focuses revealed that, as was true when Sliva and Lambert initially amassed the
database of RJ/RP laws in the United States, no state’s statutes presently require
restorative justice as a statewide, “system-wide criminal justice response.” 96
Even in Colorado, which has in place a statutorily mandated, state-level
Restorative Justice Coordinating Council, 97 a legislative proposal to import
restorative practices into the juvenile-justice system throughout the state ended
up being watered down during “the give and take of the legislative process,”
culminating in a pilot program confined to just four counties. 98
II. RECOMMENDATIONS TO GUIDE THE ENACTMENT AND REVAMPING OF
RESTORATIVE-JUSTICE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
This study’s survey and assessment of restorative-justice laws in the United
States has unearthed a plethora of substantial gaps and deficiencies in these laws.
These statutory deficits include, among others: (a) tepidity in the endorsement
of, and authorization for, the utilization of restorative practices throughout the
criminal-justice system; (b) the absence of the structural support, funding, and
procedural protections, such as confidentiality, needed for restorative justice and
practices to be a mainstay of criminal justice; and (c) the flouting at times of
core restorative precepts. The revelation of these findings is not necessarily an
indictment of past legislative endeavors to begin to bring restorative practices
into criminal justice, but rather a recognition that legislators, not steeped in the
field of restorative practices, need guidance to aid these endeavors.
This section of the Article represents an effort to provide that guidance. Set
forth below are seven recommendations for legislators that stem from the
findings of this study. These recommendations identify provisions to include in
a criminal-justice-focused RJ/RP law to correct or stave off the statutory
problems this study unveiled. While not an all-inclusive list of the recommended
contents of such a law, the prescriptions provide a needed foundation for future
legislative deliberations and drafting.
A.

Statutory provision #1: Consent to participate in a restorative practice
must be voluntary, and participants have the right to revoke their consent
at any time during the restorative process.

Including a provision in a state’s restorative-justice statute banning the
compulsion of individuals to participate in restorative processes and spelling out
that their participation must be voluntary would help forestall the contravention

96. Id. at 88.
97. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-213(1)(a) (West 2015).
98. Shannon M. Sliva, A Tale of Two States: How U.S. State Legislatures Consider
Restorative Justice Policies, 20 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 255, 262 (2017).
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of the basic restorative precept mentioned earlier in this article 99—that to
effectuate the objectives of a restorative practice, participation in it must be
voluntary. Also including a sentence in the statute affirming that consent to
participate in a restorative process can be withdrawn, without penalty, at any
point before the process is concluded would reflect the recognition that the
rationales underlying the voluntary-participation requirement apply not only at
the outset of a restorative process but throughout it. A few states’ statutes already
explicitly provide for such revocation of consent. 100
B.

Statutory provision #2: Participants must provide informed consent to
participate in a restorative process.

Another core provision in a state’s restorative-justice law would be geared
towards ensuring that the consent to participate in a restorative-justice
conference or other restorative process is informed. A general admonition in the
statute that the consent must be informed would not suffice, leaving open the
question of what a person needs to be aware of in order for his or her consent to
be considered informed within the meaning of the law. Instead, a state’s
restorative-justice statute should specify the baseline information that must be
shared before a person decides whether to engage in a facilitated restorative
dialogue. Those involved in RJ/RP planning and implementation could require,
of course, that before securing consent to participate in a restorative process in
the criminal-justice context, information be shared that goes beyond the
statutory minima.
The informed-consent provision in the Australian Capital Territory’s
Restorative Justice Act provides a good starting point for the drafting of a
parallel statutory provision in a state. 101 As mentioned earlier in this article, 102
the Australian statute requires that participants in a restorative-justice
conference be apprised of the following: (a) the purposes of a restorative-justice
conference; (b) what transpires during a conference; (c) who may participate in
the conference; (d) the “nature” of a restorative-justice agreement; (e) the right
to consult with an attorney regarding participating in a conference; (f) that no
one is obliged to participate, or continue participating, in a conference; (g) that
a person can plead not guilty to a crime and yet still accept responsibility for it
during a restorative-justice conference; (h) that when sentencing someone for a
crime, a court may, but does not have to, consider his or her acceptance of
99. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9504 (2019) (“[Any] person who voluntarily enters
an alternative case resolution process at a victim-offender alternative case resolution program . . .
may revoke . . . consent, withdraw from the alternative case resolution process, and seek judicial
or administrative redress before reaching a written agreement. A legal penalty, sanction, or restraint
may not be imposed on the person for such withdrawal.”).
101. Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004, supra note 18, at s 32A.
102. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.
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responsibility for the crime during a restorative-justice conference; and (i) that
the refusal of the person being sentenced to participate in a restorative-justice
conference cannot be considered by a court when making sentencing decisions.
While the Australian statute provides a general template for a state crafting
the informed-consent provision to be included in its own restorative-justice act,
I would advise some further fine-tuning of the Australian model. One suggested
revision is that a state’s restorative-justice statute describe more clearly the
information that must be provided about the restorative-justice agreement. The
directive in the Australian statute to explain the “nature of a restorative justice
agreement” to those contemplating participating in a restorative-justice
conference is vague. 103 Including in an RJ/RP statute additional details about the
information to be shared about a restorative-justice agreement would help ensure
that potential participants in a restorative-justice conference understand what a
restorative-justice agreement is and entails. Examples of these statutorily
prescribed details include: (a) a restorative-justice agreement’s purposes; (b) that
the terms of the agreement, including the time limits for meeting them, will be
recorded in writing; (c) the people who will receive copies of it; (d) that its
execution will be monitored by a designated individual or entity to ensure
compliance; and (e) the consequences or potential consequences of breaching an
agreement.
A state would also be well advised to include in the informed-consent
provision in its restorative-justice statute a requirement that the confidentiality
protections afforded by the law and any exceptions to those protections be
explained to potential participants in the restorative process. 104 Being informed
about the extent to which what transpires during a restorative dialogue can or
cannot be shared with others may affect whether a person wants to engage in
that dialogue. This information may also help people discern whether they need
and should procure the legal advice that they have been told, in conformance
with the statute’s informed-consent provision, 105 they have a right to seek. Being
apprised of the confidentiality protections the law extends to the restorative
process may, in addition, spark a more complete and candid conversation about
a person’s harmful actions and their effects, one unhindered by fears of potential
negative employment, reputational, legal, or other effects of statements made
during the conversation.
The third recommended refinement of the Australian model stems from the
fact that the informed-consent provision in the Australian Capital Territory’s
Restorative Justice Act focuses solely on restorative-justice conferences.
Restorative-justice conferences, however, are not the only restorative practice
103. See Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004, supra note 18, at s 32A(b)(i).
104. For a discussion of these confidentiality protections and exceptions to them, see infra notes
108-13 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
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incorporated into criminal-justice systems. 106 Therefore, when drafting a statute
to bring the wide gamut of restorative practices into its criminal-justice system,
a state would also need to spell out the information that, at a minimum, would
need to be relayed in order for a person’s participation in, for example, family
group decision-making to be considered informed.
C. Statutory provision #3: Subject to limited and defined exceptions, the
statements and records from, or related to, a restorative-justice
conference and other specified restorative processes are confidential.
For the reasons outlined earlier, 107 preserving the confidentiality of RJ/RPrelated communications and records is vital to the functioning and effectiveness
of restorative processes, affecting both the willingness of people to participate
in them and the extent to which they are open and truthful during them. A section
on confidentiality would therefore be another pivotal part of a well-drafted
restorative-justice statute. Recommended points to be incorporated into the
confidentiality section of a state’s restorative-justice act include the following:
1. All statements made during a restorative-justice conference and other
specified restorative processes, or when being screened or prepared to
participate in such a conference or process, are confidential and
privileged. 108
2. Exceptions to this general rule include: (1) when the participants agree
in writing to limited or unlimited disclosure; 109 (2) when disclosure is
106. See supra notes 45–65 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
108. The connection and distinction between confidential communications and privileged
communications is widely misunderstood. Professor Ronald Goldfarb has explained the interface
between confidential and privileged communications:
Confidentiality is a principle of legal ethics that governs when communications may
be disclosed and when, more commonly, they should remain confidential. Privilege – more
absolute – protects against compelled disclosure in a deposition or trial proceeding.
“Everything that is privileged is also protected by the confidentiality principle but the
converse is not true.”
...
There is a fundamental distinction between confidentiality generally and privileged
communications specifically. Communications between parties may be confidential, and
that confidentiality may and should be honored in most situations. Privilege goes one step
further, insulating the parties from sanctions for refusing to testify in a legal proceeding or
produce documents requested by subpoena.
RONALD GOLDFARB, IN CONFIDENCE: WHEN TO PROTECT SECRECY AND WHEN TO REQUIRE
DISCLOSURE 24–25 (2009).
109. The participants in a restorative-justice conference might grant permission, for example,
for certain information about the agreement into which they entered at the conclusion of the
conference to be shared with designated court or criminal-justice officials. This disclosed
information revealing a person’s willingness to enter into an agreement to make amends for his or
her crime might affect decisions of these officials, prompting, for example, the dismissal of a
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required by a mandatory-reporting law, such as one governing child
abuse and neglect; 110 and (3) when a statement reveals a threat to the
safety of a participant or other person. 111
3. Memoranda, notes, case files, emails, and other products of the RJ/RP
process are likewise confidential and privileged, subject to the three
delineated exceptions.
4. RJ/RP staff and volunteers shall have a right of access to all information
needed to carry out their duties. 112
5. RJ/RP researchers may be allowed access to RJ/RP-related records
provided that the information is relayed in a way that prevents the
identification of any person participating in the restorative process from
being ascertained. 113
D. Statutory provision #4: Restorative-justice conferences and other
restorative practices must be available for all types of crimes.
As discussed earlier, 114 a number of states exclude more serious crimes from
the scope of their restorative-justice-related statutory provisions. One of the
criminal charge or the imposition of a sentence different in type or severity from the one the judge
would otherwise have imposed.
Another example of why participants in a restorative-justice conference might be animated
to assent to limited or unlimited disclosure about the conference springs from the educational value
of real-life stories. Stories about what transpired before, during, and after a restorative-dialogue
process can be helpful in aiding others to understand that process and its effects, as well as to
discern ways to fine-tune the process. Participants in a restorative-justice conference might
therefore consent to the dissemination of information about the conference for educational reasons,
though the consent might sometimes include the caveat that steps be taken to preclude the identity
of the participants from being ascertained.
110. For examples of statutes instituting this exception to the general rule of confidentiality in
a restorative process, see 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5134(f)(2) (2014) (exempting communications
regarding “present child abuse”) and NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2914.01(4)(C) (2019) (exempting
communications required by the mandatory-reporting law “for new allegations of child abuse or
neglect which were not previously known or reported”).
111. For an example of a statute instituting a variant of this exception to the general rule of
confidentiality in a restorative process, see 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 5134(f)(3) (2014) (exempting
communications that “reveal an actual or potential threat to a participant’s safety”).
112. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1966(c) (2018) (according such a right of access “as
necessary to carry out their duties within the program in accordance with State and federal
confidentiality statutes and policies”).
113. See Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004, supra note 18, at s 71(3) (authorizing access to
restorative-justice database for research, analysis, and evaluation purposes but barring access to
information “that would allow the identity of anyone taking part in restorative justice to be worked
out”); Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 Children’s and Young People’s Well-being Act 1989 (N.Z.) §
38(2)(b), (3) (authorizing the publishing of the results of “bona fide research” about family group
conferences (family group decision-making) but prohibiting the publication of identifying
“particulars”).
114. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
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discordant effects of these exclusions is that they foreclose victims from
experiencing the benefits of restorative practices when the harm a crime caused
is the greatest. The constricted scope of current restorative-justice laws in the
United States also means that restorative-justice conferences are unavailable in
the cases in which, according to the research, 115 they may have their greatest
recidivism-reducing impact—those involving violent crimes.
Another criticism leveled against the exclusion of violent crimes from the
purview of a restorative-justice law is that it denotes a “lack of trust in those
applying the law.” 116 But contrary to the suppositions of lawmakers that may be
fueling this distrust, practitioners trained in restorative practices are taught to
screen out individuals when their participation would undermine the purposes
of a restorative-justice conference—when, for example, the person who
committed a crime refuses to acknowledge responsibility for it. 117
One of the recommended provisions in a state’s restorative-justice statute
would therefore extend the statute’s application to all crimes—violent as well as
nonviolent, felonies as well as misdemeanors. Some people will likely
remonstrate that certain kinds of crimes should be categorically barred from the
scope of the legislation. It consequently bears emphasizing that a wellconstructed statute would specify that a restorative-justice conference could only
be held when (a) the parties have tendered their voluntary, informed consent to
participate in it, (b) they have been deemed suitable to participate in a
restorative-justice conference by someone trained to conduct such screening,
and (c) the facilitator of the conference has the requisite training to foster a
dialogue about a crime of that nature and severity. 118
E.

Statutory provision #5: A broad range of restorative practices must be
integrated into the criminal-justice system in the state.

As discussed earlier in this article, 119 an array of restorative practices are
needed to effectively address and remediate the harm ensuing from, and
connected to, a crime and to stave off a recurrence of criminal activity. A state’s
restorative-justice statute therefore needs to list the restorative practices to be
integrated throughout the criminal-justice system in the state. This list would
115. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
116. Borbála Fellegi, Building and Toning: An Analysis of the Institutionalization of Mediation
in Penal Matters in Hungary, 14 TEMIDA 21, 29 (2011).
117. TED WACHTEL ET AL., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE CONFERENCING 187 (2010) (noting that to
be eligible to participate in a restorative-justice conference, the person who caused the harm should
admit having committed the offense).
118. For a resource outlining knowledge and skills that restorative-justice practitioners need to
facilitate a restorative process, see RESTORATIVE JUSTICE COUNCIL, supra note 14. This manual
includes a section on the additional knowledge and skills needed to facilitate “sensitive and
complex cases.” See id. at 22–24.
119. See supra notes 45–65 and accompanying text.
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include the practices that are considered “fully restorative”—restorative-justice
conferences, family group decision-making, and circles. 120 Additionally, the
statute could enumerate some of the kinds of circles falling within its scope.
Examples of the types of circles the statute could specify include those
spotlighted earlier in this article 121—Circles of Support (for victims), Circles of
Support and Accountability (to promote, among other ends, high-risk
individuals’ desistance from crime), Welcome and Reentry Circles (for persons
returning to their communities after a period of incarceration), Peacemaking
Circles (to be used, for example, proactively to address and resolve conflict
before it escalates into violence or other injurious actions), circles for
incarcerated people and their families (to promote, for example, healing within
a family reeling from the after-effects of a loved one’s crime and imprisonment),
and Compassionate Witnessing Circles (for trauma victims, including those who
have perpetrated a crime).
The list of restorative practices prescribed by the statute would not purport
to be all-inclusive. As the state of knowledge about restorative practices
continues to evolve, other restorative practices might be instituted under, and
with the aid of, the state’s restorative-justice law.
F.

Statutory provision #6: Restorative practices must be integrated
throughout all stages of the criminal-justice process.

One of the explicit aims of the Australian Capital Territory’s Restorative
Justice Act is “to enable access to restorative justice at every stage of the
criminal justice process.” 122 To help effectuate this objective, a table in the Act
lists the stages of the criminal-justice process during which individuals can be
referred for restorative-justice conferencing. 123 The stages range from the front
end of the criminal-justice process (when a person receives a warning from, or
is apprehended by, a law-enforcement official) to the back end of that process
(while a sentence is being served).
Building upon this Australian model, a well-designed restorative-justice
statute in a state would espouse the following as one of its aims: “to enable
access to restorative justice and practices at every stage of the criminal-justice
system.” This statutory provision would help ensure that not only restorativejustice conferences, but the full complement of restorative practices identified
in the state’s restorative-justice statute, are available at all stages of the criminaljustice system. Family group decision-making would then, for example, be
120. For a discussion of the ingredients of a “fully restorative” practice and why victimoffender mediation and community reparative boards generally do not fall within the category of
fully restorative practices, see supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 58–61 and 63–65 and accompanying text.
122. Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004, supra note 18, at s 6(d).
123. Id. at s 22, Table 22.
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available at any stage in the criminal-justice process when needed or helpful to
develop a plan to remedy underlying problems that contributed to an individual’s
choice to commit a crime—problems that, if unaddressed, increase the
likelihood that the criminal behavior will recur. 124
Further tracking the example of the Australian Capital Territory’s
Restorative Justice Act, a well-drafted state statute would include another
recommended provision—a list of the stages of the criminal-justice process
when victims and those who harmed them can request restorative conferencing
or access to other or additional restorative mechanisms. During any one of these
identified stages, criminal-justice officials, judges, or others, such as
caseworkers, could also refer a victim, the person who harmed the victim, or
both for screening to determine whether they want to, and are ready to,
participate in one or more of the many forms of restorative dialogue.
The statutory list denoting the stages of the criminal-justice process when a
restorative practice can be accessed would confirm that the law is according
access to the full bevy of restorative practices during the following criminaljustice stages:
1. The law-enforcement stage: The stage before a referral to a prosecutor.
2. The pre-charge stage: The stage after a prosecution referral but before
the filing of a criminal charge.
3. The post-charge, pre-conviction stage: The stage after the filing of a
criminal charge but before the person charged has pleaded, or been
found, guilty.
4. The post-conviction, presentencing stage: The stage after a conviction
but before imposition of the sentence.
5. The stage when a sentence is being served: The stage when a person is
serving a community-based sentence (such as probation), a confinement
sentence (prison or jail), or the conditional-release portion of a sentence
(such as parole).
6. The stage when a violation of a condition of probation, parole, or other
conditional sentence has occurred. By making restorative practices
available during this stage, a restorative-justice conference, circle, or
family group decision-making could be employed as part or all of the
response to a violation of a term of a conditional sentence.

124. For an overview of family group decision-making, see supra notes 46–53 and
accompanying text.
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G. Statutory provision #7: The state and communities within the state must
work together to ensure that restorative practices are integrated
throughout the criminal-justice system and must perform their delineated
responsibilities in the planning, implementation, evaluation, and funding
of criminal-justice-related restorative practices.
As mentioned earlier in this article, 125 structural support for criminal-justicerelated restorative practices, including funding support, is weak in the United
States. Correcting this void within a state and suffusing restorative practices
throughout its criminal-justice system will require well-thought-out plans, the
funding needed to implement them, care in their implementation, and ongoing
evaluation to identify how to further fine-tune each plan and its implementation.
The question is: What structure should be in place to foster the requisite
planning, funding, careful implementation, and evaluation needed for restorative
practices to flourish and a restorative ethos to permeate a state’s criminal-justice
system?
1.

A State-Local Partnership: The State’s Role

This Article recommends that a state include several provisions in its
restorative-justice statute that together create a state-local partnership to make
restorative practices part and parcel of the criminal-justice system in the state.
One provision would focus on the state’s role in this endeavor. This provision
would create a state-level planning entity responsible for providing the state
support needed if restorative practices are not only to gain a foothold in criminaljustice systems but become a hallmark of them. Somewhat tracking the Colorado
law creating a state-level Restorative Justice Coordinating Council,126 this
planning entity could potentially be called the State 127 Restorative Justice and
Practices Coordinating Council (hereinafter “State RJ/RP Council”).
Whatever the name of this planning entity, the statute should identify the
individuals, by description or title, who would comprise its members. The
purpose of this statutory prescription would be to ensure that key stakeholders
are members of this planning entity, making it more likely that they understand
restorative precepts, subscribe to them, and support their integration throughout
the criminal-justice system. Below is an illustration of who might potentially be
included on this statutory list: 128
125. See supra notes 82–98 and accompanying text.
126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-3-116(1)(a) (2017).
127. The state’s name could be added here in the state’s restorative-justice law.
128. Colorado’s restorative-justice statute requires that its Restorative Justice Coordinating
Council include, among other specified persons, the six individuals with restorative-justice
experience and expertise mentioned in the first three entries on this illustrative list. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-2-213(1)(c)(2)(e), (g), (l) (2016). Much of the rest of this list is drawn from the
description of the State Criminal Justice Council in the American Bar Association’s Model Adult
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• A victims’ representative with restorative-justice experience.
• Two members of a statewide organization (or organizations) whose
primary purpose is to develop and implement RJ/RP programs.
• Three RJ/RP practitioners.
• A person with a felony conviction who has knowledge of, or experience
with, restorative practices.
• A county sheriff.
• A chief of a city police department.
• A prosecutor.
• A criminal-defense attorney.
• A judge with jurisdiction in criminal cases.
• The head of a local probation office.
• The director of the department of corrections.
• The chair of the parole board or other entity responsible for community
supervision following release from prison.
• The chairperson of a county board.
• A city government official.
The recommended statutory provision focusing on the state’s role in
importing restorative practices into the criminal-justice system would also
outline the responsibilities of the State RJ/RP Council. Examples of these
assigned duties include:
1. State-level planning: Developing a state-level plan to implement the
restorative-justice act and aid communities in their integration of
restorative practices into their criminal-justice systems.
2. Monitoring and evaluation: Overseeing the implementation of this state
plan and evaluating the effects of the restorative-justice statute’s
implementation.
3. Training: Equipping, for example, the members of the community-level
Restorative Justice and Practices Coordinating Councils discussed later
in this article 129 to perform their RP-related planning, implementation,
and other functions.
4. Technical assistance: Providing guidance to communities and answering
questions that arise as they import restorative practices into their
criminal-justice systems.

Community Corrections Act. MODEL ADULT COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS ACT § III.B. (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1992), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/1992_my_101d.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK96-G7XX]. While the focus of the ABA Model Act is on
expanding the availability and use of community-based sentencing options, the proposed
restorative-justice statutes whose contours are fleshed out in this article would, like the ABA Model
Act, have the aim of catalyzing statewide change in criminal-justice systems.
129. See infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
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5. Information clearinghouse: Serving as a central repository of
information about RJ/RP-related plans, practices, data collection, and
evaluation in communities throughout the state.
6. Funding: Working with the state’s legislature and governor to ensure that
restorative justice and practices within criminal-justice systems in the
state are adequately funded. Serving as the state entity that dispenses
state funding to communities.
7. Public education: Informing the public about restorative justice and
practices, the restorative-justice statute and its purposes, and the statute’s
implementation and impact in the state.
8. Quality assurance: Instituting a quality-assurance process to promote the
refinement and improvement of the state’s implementation of the
restorative-justice statute on an ongoing basis. 130
2.

A State-Local Partnership: The Community’s Role

Another structure-related section of a state’s restorative-justice statute
would focus on the community component of the state-local partnership
designed to bring restorative practices into the forefront of the criminal-justice
system in the state. The American Bar Association’s Model Adult Community
Corrections Act (the “ABA Act”) contains a provision from which some insights
that bear on this statutory provision can be gleaned. 131 The ABA Act requires
each city and county to establish a local Community Corrections Board, adding
that a local jurisdiction can combine with other local jurisdictions, such as
another city or the county, in meeting this obligation. 132 Because so much of the
criminal-justice system into which restorative practices would be folded
operates or is most impactful at the local level, a state’s restorative-justice statute
could follow this model, requiring that each community establish a local RJ/RP
Coordinating Council. The restorative-justice statute, like the ABA Act, could
also be crafted flexibly enough to allow local jurisdictions, if they choose, to
collaborate in planning and implementing restorative justice and practices.
In order for the aims of the state’s restorative-justice statute to be realized,
this local planning body, like its state-level counterpart, would need to include
key stakeholders and be diverse in terms of members’ experiences, expertise,
and roles within the criminal-justice system or community. The state’s statute
should therefore contain a list of the individuals who, at a minimum, would serve
as members of the community-level coordinating council. Since this list would
not be all-inclusive, communities would still have the prerogative to include

130. See MODEL ADULT COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS ACT, supra note 128, at § III.D (vesting
the statewide planning entity established under the Model Act with many parallel responsibilities).
131. Id. at § III.B.
132. Id. at §§ I.B.1., IV.A.
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other members in order to augment the effectiveness of the local coordinating
council in that particular community.
The following list provides a starting point for discussions about who the
state’s restorative-justice statute should identify as essential members of a
Community RJ/RP Coordinating Council:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

A victim with restorative-justice experience.
Two RJ/RP experts or practitioners. 133
The local prosecutor.
The public defender or a criminal-defense attorney designated by the
local bar association.
A circuit judge who handles criminal cases.
A judge assigned to a restorative court or, if one does not exist in the
community, a drug court, mental-health court, or other problem-solving
court. 134
The head of the local probation office.
The court administrator.
The sheriff.
A police chief.
The chairperson of the County Board or other member of the County
Board who has criminal-justice-related oversight responsibilities.
A local mayor.
At least two representatives of the community, one of whom has a prior
felony conviction.

This section of the restorative-justice statute would also define the principal
responsibilities of the Community RJ/RP Coordinating Councils. Examples of
these core duties include:

133. When the Community RJ/RP Coordinating Council is first instituted, there may not be two
RJ/RP experts or practitioners within the community. The state’s RJ/RP statute and the state-level
plan developed to implement that statute can outline ways, in that event, for RJ/RP experts or
practitioners from outside the community to participate in the initial planning phase of the
Community Coordinating Council’s work.
134. The traditional focus of most courts is on the adjudication of a matter in controversy and,
in the criminal-justice context, the imposition of punishment for a crime. Douglas B. Marlowe et
al., Painting the Current Picture: A National Report on Drug Courts and Other Problem-Solving
Courts in the United Sates, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST. 12 (2016), https://www.ndci.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/Painting-the-Current-Picture-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCP3-DQLU].
By contrast, problem-solving courts, as their name suggests, address problems, such as a
behavioral-health disorder, that led to the commission of a crime. SUZANNE M. STRONG ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS, 2012, at 1 (2016),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpsc12.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TEG-6C5H]. A judge assigned
to a problem-solving court therefore has extensive experience working in a milieu that, like a
restorative court, focuses on needs beyond those that are legal.
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1. Community-level planning: Developing a comprehensive plan for the
community that accords with the state’s restorative-justice statute and
the statewide plan developed by the State RJ/RP Council. A community
plan would, for example, identify the steps and timetable to bring a broad
range of restorative practices (recommended statutory provision #5 135)
into all stages of the community’s criminal-justice system
(recommended statutory provision #6 136).
2. Monitoring and evaluation: Overseeing the implementation of the
community-level plan, ensuring that it is being implemented in
accordance with the RJ/RP state-level and community-level plans, and
evaluating the effects of the plan’s implementation.
3. Training: Ensuring that judges, criminal-justice officials, and others
involved in RJ/RP-related planning or the incorporation of restorative
practices into the criminal-justice system are well trained to perform their
RJ/RP-related functions.
4. Funding: Working, in concert with the State RJ/RP Council, to ensure
that the amount of funds allocated for restorative justice and practices is
adequate to achieve their purposes.
5. Public Education: Informing members of the community about
restorative justice and practices, the restorative-justice statute and its
purposes, the community-level plan developed pursuant to that statute,
and the implementation and impact of the community-level plan.
6. Quality assurance: Instituting a quality-assurance process to promote the
refinement and improvement of the community-level plan on an ongoing
basis.
3.

Funding

As discussed earlier, 137 grants and user fees are primary funding sources for
the importation of restorative practices into criminal justice. Such transitory
funding is a hindrance both to the development and permanency of restorative
responses to crime. Those drafting a state’s restorative-justice act will therefore
need to tackle the subject of funding for restorative justice and practices if
restorative criminal-justice systems statewide and nationwide are to become a
reality, not just a pipe dream. Two recommendations to be considered when
drafting the funding section of a state’s restorative-justice statute are briefly
spotlighted below.
First, the state’s statute should direct that state and local funds be earmarked
for restorative justice and practices in a way and amount that promote their
permanency as core features of criminal justice. The state’s restorative-justice
135. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
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statute should then outline specifics about how the mechanisms for funding
restorative practices will be contoured to realize this aim, as well as ensure that
restorative practices permeate all stages of a criminal-justice system. One
possible option is to specify in the restorative-justice statute that a defined
percentage of the state or local funds allocated for a particular stage of the
criminal-justice process, such as law enforcement or prosecution, be reserved
for the implementation of restorative practices during that stage.
Second, a state’s restorative-justice statute should require that restorativejustice conferences and other restorative practices be provided to participants
without cost. Statutes in Delaware and Tennessee already contain an analogous
provision (though one only mentioning victim-offender mediation),
conditioning eligibility for state funding of victim-offender mediation programs
on making the mediation available “without cost to the participants.” 138 Such a
statutory ban on the imposition of user fees would help ensure constancy in the
availability of funding for restorative practices. This ban would also avert other
concerns that have been raised about imposing fees on people within the
criminal-justice system to defray the costs of that system. 139 One example of
these concerns is that the financial burden of fees is an impediment to the efforts
of low-income people to rebuild their lives following a criminal conviction. 140
III. CONCLUSION
This study’s examination of the restorative-justice laws that have thus far
been enacted in the United States has revealed that they not only fail to support
restorative practices in a way that will enable them to become rooted in the
culture of criminal-justice systems but that they are commonly drafted in
contravention of basic restorative precepts, such as the tenet that participation in
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9502(b)(4) (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-20-102(b)(3)
(2009).
139. For a canvassing of these concerns, see, for example, Karin D. Martin et al., Shackled to
Debt: Criminal Justice Financial Obligations and The Barriers to Re-Entry They Create, NAT’L
INST. OF JUST. (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249976.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6WPGTT6]; Arthur W. Pepin, The End of Debtors’ Prisons: Effective Court Policies for Successful
Compliance with Legal Financial Obligations, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS (2016),
https://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/End-of-Debtors-Pris
ons-2016.ashx [https://perma.cc/68HW-PPD6]; COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de
fault/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/V75F-RFSN]; In
for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prisons, ACLU (2010), https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/field_document/InForAPenny_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5E8-VYSG]; and
Alicia Bannon et al., Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
(2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Criminal-Justice-Debt%20A-Barrier-Reentry.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9CW-YXV4].
140. See, e.g., Bannon et al., supra note 139, at 2, 27–29.
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restorative practices must be voluntary. This Article provides guidance to aid in
the much-needed revamping and enactment of restorative-justice laws to redress
these problems. The recommended statutory provisions previewed in this Article
would:
• Require that participation in a restorative practice be voluntary and
affirm that consent to participate can be withheld or withdrawn at any
point without penalty.
• Require that consent to participate in a restorative practice be informed
and spell out information that must be relayed for consent to be
considered informed.
• Treat statements and records from a restorative process as confidential
and privileged, subject to several limited exceptions.
• Require that restorative practices be available for all types of crimes.
• Provide for the implementation of a wide array of restorative practices
throughout the criminal-justice system.
• Provide access to restorative justice and practices at every stage of the
criminal-justice process.
• Establish a state-level RJ/RP planning body and define the state’s
responsibilities in the planning, implementation, evaluation, and funding
of criminal-justice-related restorative practices.
• Require the establishment of community-level RJ/RP planning bodies
and define their responsibilities in the planning, implementation,
evaluation, and funding of criminal-justice-related restorative practices.
The careful honing of these and other provisions in states’ restorative-justice
laws would help suffuse restorative practices throughout criminal-justice
systems and communities’ responses to crime. These laws would bring us one
step closer to a “new reality” 141 marked by a societal commitment to the
prevention and repair of harm, promotion of civil and constructive dialogue, and
fostering of strengthened and repaired relationships—a reality for which hurting
individuals, fractured communities, and a divided country yearn.

141. TED WACHTEL, DREAMING OF A NEW REALITY: HOW RESTORATIVE PRACTICES REDUCE
CRIMES AND VIOLENCE, IMPROVE RELATIONSHIPS AND STRENGTHEN CIVIL SOCIETY 3 (2013).

